FICTIONALISATION OF IDENTITY AND HAPLOGROUP IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Adriana-Claudia Cîteia, Assist. Prof., PhD, "Ovidius" University of Constanța

Abstract: The antiquity has proposed two paradigms for the definition of the self:
- the classical paradigm of the self knowledge developed on the Platonic impulse of self-improvement – kreitto autou, of the man that is self possessed – and of the synonymy between gnosis and epimeleia, and
- the Christian paradigm (persisting in the Middle Ages) in which the self knowledge represents the condition of approaching God, and in which gnosis and epimeleia are no longer synonymous. In Christianism, the self knowledge gains heroic dimensions since it implies an enormous effort of epektasis (spiritual ascension). The metamorphosis of the parepidemical identity are conditioned by ascetism as self work on oneself, and kenosis, self depletion, as a condition of knowing the Truth.
According to the modern thinking, the stages of self knowledge were defined either in the Christian context of the non-selfishness, and self abnegation as a consequence of love for the neighbor, or in the context of rediscovering the subjectivism independently form the Christian model, with a concern to giving up guilt and self complicity, free from canonic constraint.
Freed from the medieval sacred structure, from the conduct imposed by divine will, and from the chains between the Creator and the world, the post-Renaissance man has set the rules of the „self indulgence", of the intimate contact with the self, of the own-determined freedom. The self looses its divine aura, sketched in the medieval theology by the doctrine of the man's creation in God's own image, the mystical approach of self-exploration and self-knowledge being replaced by individual perfection, living aside the exigencies of the classical or Christian archetypal heroism, replaced in the contemporary period by artificial archetypes.
In the modern ages, fictionalization of identity is motivated by the incapacity of communicating, the refuse of the otherness, by the feeling of incompatibility with the others, which determines the apparition of an ideology of the independence and self-sufficiency, or by the return in a heroic time inspired by the local, national or European history. Policronia thus redefines the durandian concept of hipotiposis of the past, understood as a progressive contemporaneousness with the eternal values of a culture.
If the meaning ascribed for the nation is a group of those born on a given territory, with a specific cultural matrix and history, with a specific feeling of belonging and identification, then the meaning of a haplogroup emphasizes the nonnative dimension of a small, simple group of people, defined in a virtual cronotopic context, with same concerns and values and with real or fictionalized identities.
In the Age of Globalization, we can define the concepts of etnoidentity, okhloidentity, haploidentity.

Keywords: identity, fictionalization, haplogroup, policronia, hipotiposis

Hypothesis relatively recent, formulated in connection to the modalities of defining and expressing the individual identity signals the possibility of the personal reidentification in time, of modifying the perception of the self, as well as the possibility of modifying the identitary discontinuity[1]. The relative continuity of identity admits different degrees, up to the postmodern denial of the coherence of the *self*[2].

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[1] Jennifer Radden, "Identity, Personal Identity, Characterization Identity and Mental Disorder" in *The Philosophy of Psychiatry*, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 133 and the next Eadem, *Divided Minds and Successive Selves*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996.

[2] O. Flanagan, *Multiple Identity, Character Transformation and Self-Reclamation*, Oxford University Press, 1996.

The hypothesis of a fragmented identity, of a self composed of hypostasis producing a language of the multiple self[3] transform the individual in a "multiplex"[4]. In the analysis of O. Flanagan the self of a puzzle type is profoundly different from the dissociated self which supposes several narrators which cannot set a coherent connection between the narrative segments belonging to the self. The dissociated identity implies the existence of some subunits of the self ("subselves") which do not communicate between them, which are incompatible and act as alter-identities[5].

The dissociation of the identity was defined as a breach in the integrator puzzle of the identitary hypostasis[6], as manifestation of either an adaptative capacity or of a defensive mechanism[7]. In between the alter-identities the dissociative barrier is permeable, so that it appears the possibility of the identitary reassociation[8].

One of the questions resulted from the analysis of the dissociative identity is whether the human being are profoundly unitary of whether the self of each person is organized in "colonies" of *selves*.

Another question is whether a pre-dissociative self exists, which would be dynamized by certain external factors. Is it maintained the connection between the pre-dissociative self and its post-dissociative divisions? The dissociative self creates new irreversible identities or only ephemeral identitary hypostases? Is there the possibility of controlling the pre-dissociative complexity of the *self*?

A particular hypothesis is that of the fictive self, specific to the dissociate identity and developed in leverage with the real one, and accompanied by the memory malformation[9]. The recall of a past event thus supposes its fictive re-experimentation, redescription according to a scenario adapted to the rules of the complicity with the self[10]. The recall ("image excerpted from the past"[11]) becomes the nucleus around which is built an identity of cryptomnesic type, a protective identitary coating, obtained by regression. The recall of an event at a certain distance in time supposes the return to an earlier phase of personality as an allogeneic entity[12]. In the autodiegetic approach, at certain moment, the narration about the self looses truthfulness, the actual end of an episode in life being removed, cut and rebuilt to the effect searched by the autobiographer[13].

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[3] K. Wilkes, "How many Selves make Me?" in D. Cockburn (ed.), *Human Beings*, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[4] *Ibidem*.

[5] *Ibidem*.

[6] B. G. Brown, "The BASK (Behavior, Affect, Sensation, Knowledge) Model of Dissociation", *Dissociation,* (1998) 1 1: p. 4-23.

[7] Stephen E. Braude, "The Nature and Significance of Dissociation", in Jennifer Radden, *op. cit*., p. 107-116.

[8] S.E. Braude, *First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind*, rev. ed. Lanham MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

[9] G. Graham, "Recent Work in Philosophical Psychopatology" , *American Philosophical Quarterly*, (2002) 39: p. 109-133; N. Spanos, *Multiple Identity and False Memories: a Sociocognitive Perspective*, Washington DC, American Psychological Association, 1996, *passim.*

[10] Fictionalization of the self and installation of the false memory may be reactions to traumatizing events, conflicts or stages following the identitary saturation. S. M. Park, "False Memory Syndrome", Hypatia, (1997) 12,2: p. 1-50.

[11] C.G. Jung, *Personalitate şi transfer*, Teora Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996, p. 34.

[12] Ian Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory*, Princeton University Press, 1995, *passim.*

[13] *Ibidem*.

"The Ulysses Contracts"[14], the exercises of the "dominated future"[15] or of the "previous autonomy"[16] are attempts of anticipation of the identitary metamorphosis, and of correcting the inclinations of identitary malformation or of preventing the consequences of such through the "self censure"[17].

The Ulysses Contracts as form of self-control and of prevention of some actions which could have negative consequences in the individual moral plan, and also in the collective plan were inspired from the Homeric episode of the meeting between the hero in Troja and the Mermaids. Hybrid magical being, the mermaids were seducing the sailors with the melodiousness of their songs and allured them in high seas, far from any reference point. Ulysses and the heroes accompanying him way back to Ithaca tied themselves to the mast not to surrender to the irresistible calls.

The Homeric episode of the meeting with the Mermaids may be interpreted in the light of the importance of self-knowledge as modality of censuring one's own desires and passions with the help of the reasoning (the metaphor of the mast). In the Homeric parabola the self-knowledge represents the only modality of anticipation and avoidance, of preventing those subjective actions with negative consequences on the existential itinerary.

The identity metamorphoses, just like its prophylaxis, do not exclude the persisting attributes of personality. The metamorphosis could be defined as variation on the same identitary archetypal structure or as identity progressing to otherness.

Anticipating the identitary metamorphosis as well as the eventual risks of nosological nature, one can attempt to control it through a set of preset measures with an individual character called "The Ulysses Contracts". *The Ulysses Contracts* have the dimension of an ethical dilemma especially when the individual's autonomy and his capacity to exercise the freedom of decision are at stake. In this analysis may also be included the issue of individual authenticity, to which the contracts of Ulysses contradicts. The decisions regarding the identitary metamorphoses should be understood as forms of manifestation of the individual autonomy and not as a sum of measures imposed from the exterior in view of ensuring the persistence of some character attributes.

Yet there is also the hypothesis of a metamorphosis which is independent from a constant identitary structure and which is based on the narrative fictionalized construction of the self, in stages:

a. the redefinition of the individual as a character, according to the classical structure of the Proteus archetype or by imitation;

b. the setting in of the identitary dimorphism based on the dissociation of the narrator and character;

c. the recomposition by fictive identification[18] case in which the identity becomes synonym with the self-characterization, through the narration about the *self*[19].

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[14] R. Dresser, "The Ulysses Contract", *Hastings Center Report*, (1984) 14, 3: p. 13-16.

[15] A. Buchanan, "Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, (1988) 17, 4: p. 277-302.

[16] M. Quante, "Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity", *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, (1999) 9, 4: p. 365-381.

[17] A. Buchanan, *loc.cit*.

[18] J. Radden uses in *op. cit*., p. 143 the syntagma "fictive classification of the self".

[19] M. Schechtman, *The Constitution of selves*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996.

Particular forms of identitary dimorphism are the "**thought insertion**"[20] and the **identification.**

a. the thought insertion consists in assigning the own thoughts to a foreign origin[21]. Life becomes a screen on which "somebody else" projects thoughts as if projecting a movie, a scenario, o series of images. The thought insertion as version of fictionalization of the self is the result of the impossibility of the individual to assume his own conscious activity. The personal experience is borrowed of imposed from an error of thoughts assignment. Examples of thought insertion on which were built identitary models are the syntagmas of New-Testamentary inspiration "I am a fool, I am wise", "I am from this world, I am a foreigner and traveller on the Earth".

I am a fool - in the system of reference of the world, *I am wise* - in the Christian system of reference. The assuming of one's parepidemical identity is the result of reading the biblical text, and consequently of the insertion of some borrowed thoughts. Considering the individual experience, the attempt of defining the personal involvement in the understanding of a topic fails. The thought insertion is a form of release from the pressure of deliberation yet it is also the expression of a refuse, of an abandon, of placing the failure in building the autonomous identity into the responsibility of another's type of thinking.

b. the identification with a model, with a foreign identitary hypostasis (the reverse of the Pygmalion complex) may occur under the influence of a feeling of guilt, can be the result of the wish to get into a certain condition (*ifidentity*) or it may be the consequence of some identitary analogies between individuals[22].

The Freudian hypothesis of work in defining the dissociated identity is represented by the dual structure of the ego. One part is the result of an introjection which includes in itself a lost inaccessible yet wanted object based on which the identification can be done. The other part represents the moral conscience, the critical court of the Ego, called by Freud "the ideal of the Ego", having as functions the self-diegesis and the censure of desires.[23] The ideal of the Ego is the bearer of a primary, infantile, self-sufficient narcissism, on which overlap the exigencies imposed by the natural and social environment. The conflict between the primary Ego and the ideal Ego, between the complicity with the self and duty, between the *narragonian* interior space and the *paradisiac* space has as consequence the identitary dissociation.

The dissociation of the Primary Ego from the Ideal Ego may be temporarily suppressed. The breach of the restrictions and limitations imposed by the social norms takes place periodically, during the Holydays. Since the Ideal of the Ego includes the sum of all restrictions, the unification of the Ideal Ego with the Primary Ego has a therapeutic effect, of self-contempt, of complicity with the self.

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[20] George Graham, "Self-Ascription. Thought Insertion" in Jennifer Raden, *The Philosophy of Psichiatry*, p. 89-103.

[21] G- L. Stephens, G. Graham, *When Self-Consciousness breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts*, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2000. *Iibidem*, "Self Consciousness, Mental Agency and the Clinical Psychopathology of Thought Insertion", *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology* (1994) 1: p.1-10.

[22] Sigmund Freud, *Opere*, vol. 4, *Studii despre societate şi religie*, Trei Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 71-93.

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 77.

In the Freudian analysis the step through which the individual distances himself from the ideals of the community is the myth. In the subjective mythology of the hero, the author and his personage (descended from the archetypal gallery of the paraclete heroes[24]) are hypostases of the same identity. The climax of the heroic mythology is represented by the self-divinization of the hero, by the return to narcissism.[25]

The myth of psychological nature of the hero makes possible the *apokatastasis*[26] of the past, of the ancestors, of the entire identitary archetypal basin which allows the individual to return to his own totality[27]. Yet the subjective perspective is never total. The dependence on the others which are "the same as I" constantly interrupts this process and subordinates the individual identity to a complex of resembling identities. The individual identity thus becomes part of an identitary system of reference constituted based on the similarities between the individuals. Thus the individual becomes part of a haplogroup (limited group, constituted on criteria which exclude the ethnical systems of reference or the geographical, associative one). In the context of the multiple identity the identitary hypostases are characterized by the interaction, juxtaposition or omission of certain identitary sequences or by the very definition of an identity of "collage" type in which are combined autobiographical sequences borrowed from other biographies[28].

The identity defined as a consequence of the primordiality of instrumental reasoning[29] in the modern ages, and also of the existence of an identitary classical basin[30] has lead to the loss of interest in the community, to the practice of the cult of distance[31], to the self-delimitation within a protector interior space in which the dialogue with the self would not be interrupted by any outside intervention and in which the return to the self would coincide with the discovery of one's own freedom.

The identities of anarchetypal nature represent the source of an individualism which creates subjective axiological systems expecting to be recognized and respected. The interfaces of the identities of anarchetypal nature undergo continuous modifications, amplifications, the communication between them being possible by means of imagination[32]. The deconstruction of the unique, centered identity and its reconstruction under the form of multiple identity by means of imagination and of spontaneous creativity determines major modifications in the philosophic speech about the self-knowledge and about the self-fictionalization and virtualization.

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[24] Consoling.

[25] Idem, "Pentru a introduce narcisismul", in *Opere*, vol. III, *Psihologia inconştientului*, Trei Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000.

[26] The profane signification of the concept of apokatastasis, borrowed from the Christian dogmatic is that of salvation of the past, of forgiving the mistakes from the past and reconciliation with the self.

[27] C.G., Jung, *Arhetipurileşi inconştientul colectiv*, Editura Trei, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 195.

[28] *Ibidem*, p. 136.

[29] Charles Taylor*, Etica autenticităţii*, Idea Design and Print Publishing House, Cluj, 2006, p. 11.

[30] Gilbert Durand, *Structurile antropologice ale imaginarului*, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucureşti, 1998, *passim*.

[31] Adrian Paul Iliescu, *Solitude and the Birth of Modernity*, Cris Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 7-18.

[32] Corin Braga, *Concepte şi metode în studiul imaginarului*, Polirom Publishing House, Iasi, 2009, p. 17-18.

In this case the approach of self-knowledge implies the translation of an autodiegetic narration[33] built on a logical schema of analysis, in a translogical plurimorphous narration which suspends the classical explicative monologue[34].

A concept used in analyzing the multiple anarchetypal identity and defined through the sequential approach of identity is the concept of *free-floating attention* which impels the ad-hoc creativity, capable of exploring the identitary facets. The analysis of the multiple identity cannot be done by setting archetypal conflicts which provoke the pulverization of identity, yet analogically, through an analysis considered in connection to the immediate context, found in the background of any identitary interface.

The interaction between the centered identities and the multiple ones imposes the analysis of the simultaneous "personal alterities" (defined by the concept of celerity[35]) which are also successive, polychronic, and polytopical[36].

The successive personal alterities are put into relation and analyzed through anamnesis. The memory sets the utility of some past identitary stages, it effects their selection, it associates past and present identitary stages, it ensures the progressive contemporaneity with the past (which may imply the process of hypotiposis[37]) and implicitly the apparition of the polychronical identity, thus structuring a basin of the real or fictive personal experience, a personal horizon of significations[38], in which the relation between tradition and daily life is uninterrupted[39].

Yet it is also possible the hypothesis of the incompatibility between the actual past and daily life, case in which the identity is built based on the denial of the real horizon of significations and on the fictionalization of memory. The individual identity is thus redefined through instrumental constructs which metaphorize the autodiegetic speech, the interrogation of the self having as consequence the definition of the virtual self and of the virtual identity. The multiple identity may thus be defined as a succession or simultaneity of real, fictive and virtual identities.

The dynamics of the self-fictionalization expresses the capacity of the individual to transform the unreal into a component of reality, of cancelling the distinction between real, possible and fictive. In case of multiple identity the fictionalization and virtualization become techniques of the self-knowledge[40].

The archetypology is useful in the attempt to explain the assimilation of an archetype into another and the meta-fictionalism, in understanding the techniques of inserting a fiction into another o fiction, both having impact on installing the multiple successive identity. Thus, an event prefigures another which will after a certain interval of time. For example, the sacrifice of Isaac was interpreted as a prologue of the Christi sacrifice, the two events being

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[33] Auguste Bailly, *Abrégé du dictionnaire grec-français*, Paris, 1829, p. 134.
[34] Corin Braga, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
[35] Wlad Godzich, *Philosophie einer nicht- europischen Literaturkritik*, Fink, 1989, *passim*.
[36] Cornelius Castoriadis, *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy. Essays in Political Philosophy*, ed. David, Ames, Curtis, Oxford university Press, Oxford *passim*.
[37] Gilbert Durand, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
[38] Idem, *Introducere în mitodologie*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj, 2004, p. 77-78.
[39] ip. Charles Taylor, in *Etica autenticității*, loc. cit.
[40] Thomas Brook, *The New Historicism and other Old-Fashioned Topics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, p. 72; Hans Blumenberg, *Work on Mith*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 116; Hayden White, *The Tropics of Discourse*, Johns Hobkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978, p. 98.

placed in a proorismatic relation (an archetype announces the formation of another). The symbolical affinity of the two biblical episodes reflects a certain attitude towards the providence. The archetypes are connected in time yet they can also be analyzed from the perspective of the progressive contemporaneity with the reader and implicitly from the perspective of the homogenous time. The two mentioned archetypal situations can also be in symbolic affinity with the Prometheic sacrifice. According to the theory of homogenous plenary time[41], the events are diachronically put into relation, through causal relations, yet also synchronically, through mutual conditioning.

Within the identitary structure, the relation set between the three mentioned archetypes (Prometheus, Isaac, Jesus) may produce three identitary hypostases built on the idea of the mimetic sacrifice. The successive identification with the three models supposes relating one's own life with the specific temporal context of the three characters, possible through meta-fictionalization.

Thus, the meta-fictionalization is possible only when the archetypes are put in relation through symbolic affinity and encapsulated in each other. In this way, in the same narrative space different identitary hypostases simultaneously manifest and the character engaged in the narration of the self is defined gradually, exploring his own archetypal memory.

Finally life is lived and understood as a story and the narrator is defined by the crucial events in his biography in which he identifies an archetypal structure for himself.

The fictionalization of one's own identitary itinerary modifies the autodiegetic speech, the subject referring to himself as a fictive character or a virtual hero. The multiple identity is signaled by the apparition of double hypostasis in the context of a unique identitary scenario: the author and the hero of the narration about the self are no longer one and the same person. The identitary discontinuity (intended or unintended) and the apparition of the multiple identity is accompanied by the metamorphosis of the subject into an active observer, yet no longer solidary with himself.

The fictionalization and virtualization of the self does not manifest exclusively in the modern thinking. Attributes of protofictionalism are obvious since the period of the classical Greek antiquity. The central issue of the fictionalist point of view is the contrast between accepting and believing, contrast noticeable in the Hellenistic skepticism and in the works of Sextus Empiricus (2nd century A.C.). For "*X is F*" the skeptic uses "*X seems to be F*[42]".

Yet there appear questions of the type: to what extent do the fictionalization and the theatralization of identity overlap? Is theatrality a temporary form of fictionalization or is it part of the archetypal identitary basin, while the archetype of Proteus is constantly present both in case of the centered identity and on that of the multiple identity?

An plausible hypothesis is that according to which the proteic identity is specific to the archetypal identitary axis, case in which the term is no longer adequate to the idea of identity metamorphosis; in exchange, its radical hyerproteic anarchetypal form, triggering role playing, becomes typical to the multiple identity[43].

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[41] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*,. The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 288.

[42] *Ibidem,* p. 18.

[43] Radu Surdulescu, *Critica mitic-arhetipală*, All Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, p. 40-60.

The hyperproteic multiple identity may be composed of compensatory identities, simultaneously or successively engrafted by a nuclear safe, due to exterior stimuli[44].

The fictionalization of identity supposes the escape from the closed system of spatial-temporal events, and the adequacy to a system of worlds which are simultaneously or successively possible. The coexistence of the real and imagined identity thus redefines the "interior otherness". The fictionalization of identity supposes the change, the continuous adapting of it to the plurality of spaces proposed by the mythical-religious systems, with the help of imagination, memory and of a complex of *parafernalia*[45] with religious character, artistic or ludic (in the infantile fictionalization of identity or in the manifestation of identity of anamnetic type, which is built on the idea of the contemporaneity with the past[46]).

A consequence of the fictionalization of identity may be the emergence of the mimetic identity (of type "just like" built by identification with a model), but also the rise of some fictive concentric identities, by successive reference to characters the qualities of which are borrowed and mimed by the subject, which migrate from a fictive *topos* to another. The fictive identity could be correlated with the polychronical identity[47], both being constituted by different temporal sequences belonging to multiple temporal enstases. Castoriadis defines the autonomy of the individual in connection with his heteronomy[48], the self-occultation in relation with the society or with the supernatural cause. The individual should position himself as critic actor of what he is, was and may be. "The past and present are only congestion of gross facts, except if they are critically reevaluated by us"[49]. Castoriadis proves that in the modern thinking the process of "self-training" restarts from where the classical Greek culture has left it.

Anthony Giddens uses the concept of "empty space", distinctly from the place[50]. This space is fictionalized, virtualized and simultaneous the personalization of the social time. The fictionalization of space and the personalization of time are necessary to compensate at imaginary level the failures from the real daily space. The "empty space" can be defined only by distancing oneself from the others; it becomes a space of invisible otherness and isolation. The daily life is resignificated, with the meaning of presentificating the past, of overlapping the past-present enstases, of condensing the past into present; and the future is conceived under the form of hopes, of personal expectations.

In the Mead[51]-Turner[52] hypothesis the distinction between the fictionalized self and the spontaneous one is given by the modalities of interaction between the individual and the community he is part of. The multiple self is thus defined in the effort of compatibilizing the needs and the personal expectations with the requirements of the society. In the background of this relation yet stands an ontic referent of personality (a "horizon of significations" according

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[44] *Ibidem.*
[45] Instrumentar, cf. Auguste Bailly, *op. cit.*, p. 662.
[46] Mark Eli Kalderon ed., *Fictionalism in metaphysics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, p. 14-65.
[47] Cornelius Castoriadis, *op. cit., passim.*
[48] Idem, *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*, p. 20-21, 132-133.
[49] *Ibidem*, p. 4.
[50] Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1991, Idem, *Consecinţele modernităţii*, trad. Sandra Beru, Univers Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000.
[51] G.H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, University of Chicago Press, 1934, passim.
[52] R.H. Turner, "The Real Self: from institution to impulse", *American Journal of Sociology*, (1976) 81.

to the Charles Taylor's vocabulary), a group of stable characteristics specific to the cultural matrix to which the individual belongs, an archetypal self[53].

The expression "multiple self", "modal self" was consecrated in 1986 by H. Markus and P. Nurius[54]. The mentioned researchers are using the syntagma "multiple Self", and that of "possible Self" with the meaning of capacity of metamorphosis of the individual as expression of the necessity of adapting to different social contexts; the facets of the self are, thus, the result of the interactions with the others, of the availability to communicate, the possible self being in general conceived in a positive way. The possible self may yet also have negative connotation when the historical context is discouraging or when the future is understood from the perspective of the finitude of life.

The possible self also has a compensatory role: the unsatisfying past or present may be compensated by a better (forthcoming or eshatological) future[55].

K. Gergen[56] has proposed the concept of "saturated self", resulted after the exaggerated use of the individual hyperproteic capacities, of excessive fictionalization, yet also of "desincrustation" (concept inspired from Anthony Giddens's theory of the *dissembedding*), of the detachment from the fixed chronotopical systems of reference. In this case, the possibilities of communication have been exhausted, the individual awaits nothing more from the society and offers nothing.

The saturated self is a narcissist self, freed from the exterior constraints; it is created through the effect of the false uniqueness, of a pseudo-mythology of the solitary hero which can be "next to the others", yet not "together with them". The saturated identity may produce profound changes in the narration about the self, through the fragmentation in episodes independent from a chronologic system of reference. The meandering into one's own fiction has, in this case, the unique purpose of reveal a hero which is "monadic and contrasts with the others, with the social and natural environment"[57].

The mythology of the solitary hero is the consequence of the dramatic attempt to redefine the personal history as a sum of significant moments. The hero is no longer the character involved in a dramatic fight in the name of an ideal of his community, yet the proteic personage, captive in the adventure of his own life. He suffers successive metamorphoses, to be able to pass from a floor of his own biography to another. The hero is the one which redefines himself, which dominates his "fraction of time and piece of space"[58].

Thus the individual heroism consists in finding out "what you are capable of"[59], and the self-contemplation should have as result the discovery of one's own grandeur. The

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[53] The definitions of the self, originated from the philosophical, psychological and literary area, suggest a complex structure formed by *id* (or self) - the cognitive self, *I*- creator self, *Me*- fictionalized self, "institutionalized"; S. Taylor, P. Gollwitzer, "Effects of mindset on positive illusions", *Journal of Personality and Social Psichology*, (1995) 2: p. 137.
[54] H. Markus, P. Nurius, "Possible Selves", *American Psychologist*, (1986) 41.
[55] Alfred Adler, *The Theory and Practice of individual Psychology*, Harcourt, Brace and World, New Zork, 1927.
[56] *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in contemporary life,* Basic Brook, New York, 1991.
[57] C. Geertz, "From the native's point of view: on the nature of anthropological understanding" in K. Basso, H Selby (editors), *Meaning in anthropology*, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1974; R. Stevens, *Understanding the Self*, Sage, London, 1996.
[58] Ernst Cassirer, *Mitul statului*, Institutul European, Iasi, 2001, p. 244.
[59] Th. Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, II, VIII, p. 156-157, în Ernst Cassirer, *op. cit.,* p. 257.

mythological heroes are analyzed in a euhemerist system of reference, the purpose being that of setting the compatibility between the attributes of paradigmatic characters and the own attributes.[60].

The identitary paradigms built by fictionalization and heroization of the self are polychronic and mimetic, the fictionalization being the modality of escaping from a non-comfortable reality into an interior space in which the "fraction of time" and the "piece of space" are defined according to one's own rules. The self-heroization, the hyperproteism, the fictionalization of the self become necessary in the attempt to delimit the interior citadel from the exterior, hostile space. The identity of the solitary hero is a multiple identity, saturated of successive metamorphoses, of the succession between the offensive on the exterior world and the retreats at the shelter of the interior fortress.

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[60] Idem, *Cultul eroilor*, Prelegerea I, p. 37, *apud* Ernst Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

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